Am Geld gesundet die Welt

Immobilienkrise, Finanzkrise, Wirtschaftskrise, Schuldenkrise - einen positiven Effekt hatten die Dramen der vergangen Jahre: Jetzt beschäftigen sich auch jene mit Gelddingen, die sich dafür bislang nicht interessierten. Leider zu spät. Etwas mehr Know-how hätte den Absturz vielleicht verhindert.

Vor ein paar Monaten fragte mich meine Freundin Isabel nach einem Grillfest, ob ich eigentlich an die Inflation glaubte. Es klang so, als hätte sie jemanden mit einer ihr fremden Religion kennengelernt und wollte nun wissen, was davon zu halten sei.

Wir standen in ihrer Küche, um die letzten Gläser abzutrocknen, Deutschland hatte gerade gegen England im Achtelfinale gewonnen, ich hätte in diesem Augenblick alle möglichen Fragen erwartet, aber sicher keine zur drohenden Geldentwertung. Außerdem kommt meine Freundin aus der Kulturszene, da interessiert man sich für Finanzdinge nur, wenn plötzlich die Subventionen ausbleiben. Also fragte ich erst einmal zurück, warum sie sich denn jetzt um Himmels willen Gedanken über eine Inflation mache.

Ein Bekannter habe sie zu einem Vortrag mit George Soros an der Berliner Humboldt-Uni mitgenommen, sagte Isabel. Sie verstehe ja nicht viel von solchen Dingen, aber der Investor habe das Publikum vor einer schweren Rezession gewarnt, verheerender noch als die letzte, weil diese mit einer verhängnisvollen Deflation verbunden sei. So wie sie es verstanden habe, bleibe uns nur die Möglichkeit, ganz schnell ganz viele Schulden zu machen, um das Schlimmste abzuwenden. Mein erster Gedanke an eine religiöse Begegnung war also gar nicht so falsch, wie sich herausstellte.

Muss man sich vor Deflation mehr fürchten als vor Inflation?

Man mag von Soros halten, was man will. Ich persönlich finde es eher kurios, wenn Leute Empfehlungen zur Währungsstabilität geben, die ihren Lebensunterhalt damit verdienen, diese zu erschüttern. Von Spekulationsgeschäften versteht der Milliardär etwas, keine Frage, dafür spricht schon die Tatsache, dass er seine Quantum Fonds außerhalb der US-Finanzkontrolle in Offshore-Paradiesen wie den Niederländischen Antillen angesiedelt hat. Genau dieser Umstand wäre für mich aber auch Grund genug, seinen politischen Ratschlägen zu misstrauen. Trotzdem bemühte ich mich, Isabels Frage ernst zu nehmen.

Ob man sich mehr vor einer Deflation oder einer Inflation fürchten muss, ist nicht so einfach zu sagen. Bei einer Deflation sinken die Preise, was zunächst wenig beängstigend klingt. Aber weil die Leute darauf setzen, dass im nächsten Monat alles noch billiger wird, schieben sie größere Einkäufe auf, was der Wirtschaft gar nicht gut bekommt. Bald sinken überall die Einkommen, worauf alle sparen müssen, die Folge sind Massenentlassungen und weitere Sparrunden, theoretisch ist diese Deflationsspirale unendlich.

Die Inflation wiederum verbinden die Deutschen bis heute mit der größten Krise, die das Land heimgesucht hat: Wenn eine Schachtel Zigaretten so viel kostet wie eben noch ein ganzes Haus, dann ist irgendwann die ganze Welt aus den Fugen. Ich glaube dennoch, wir werden um ein wenig Inflation nicht herumkommen. Die schleichende Geldentwertung ist der einzige Weg, die enormen Schulden- und Pensionslasten zu bewältigen, die auf die öffentlichen Haushalte drücken. Hoffen wir nur, dass die Inflation nicht außer Kontrolle gerät, das nennt man dann Hyperinflation und endet in der Regel mit einem Währungsschnitt.

Viele haben mehr Ahnung vom Gazastreifen als von der eigenen Rente

Die meisten Menschen sind erstaunlich unsicher, wie sie ökonomische Tatbestände bewerten sollen, dabei müssen sie im Alltag häufig sehr viel kompliziertere Dinge beurteilen. Viele treffen regelmäßig Entscheidungen und haben Berufe, die eine lange und gründliche Ausbildung voraussetzen, aber wenn das Gespräch auf die Grundlagen unseres Wirtschaftsgeschehens kommt, müssen sie passen. Vielen fällt es leichter, die Situation im Gazastreifen zu beurteilen als den Stand ihrer Rente.

Die wenigsten würden bestreiten, dass es durchaus von Vorteil wäre, sie wüssten besser Bescheid, wie der Kapitalismus eigentlich funktioniert. Beinahe täglich werden sie mit Nachrichten konfrontiert, die sie nicht wirklich beurteilen können, die aber für ihre Zukunft und die ihrer Kinder enorme Bedeutung haben.

Ob es richtig oder falsch war, für die Rettung des Euro ein Mehrfaches des Bundeshaushalts einzusetzen, ist so eine Frage, über die viele gern mehr Klarheit hätten. War es wirklich notwendig, die Schuldverpflichtungen in der Finanzkrise in solche Höhen zu treiben, dass noch die Generation der Enkel und Urenkel die Zinsen dafür zahlen müssen? Wie weit lassen sich Steuersätze heben oder senken, ohne dass die Leistungsfähigkeit des Landes leidet? Was ist eigentlich an der Behauptung dran, der zufolge die Schere zwischen Arm und Reich immer weiter auseinandergeht?

2. Teil: Dumm nur, dass die Volksvertreter kaum mehr wissen als brave Sparer

Eine Folge der Finanzkrise ist sicher, dass sich nun auch Menschen mit wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhängen beschäftigen, die sich dafür vorher nicht besonders interessierten. Wenn die Krise eines gelehrt hat, dann wie abhängig jeder von Entscheidungen ist, die in irgendwelchen Handelsräumen in New York, London oder Tokio getroffen werden. Es sind mächtige Kräfte, die da draußen wirken, unheimlich wie alles, was sich zunächst der Erklärung entzieht.

Dass auch viele Volksvertreter, die das Land vor größerer Unbill schützen sollen, kaum mehr wissen als die braven Sparer, macht die Sache nicht besser. Vermutlich wäre uns sogar einiges erspart geblieben, wenn die gesetzgeberische Aufsicht der Finanzmärkte nicht in den Händen von Leuten gelegen hätte, die bis vor kurzem noch Mühe hatten, den Unterschied zwischen "call" und "put" zu erklären, beziehungsweise Letzteres für einen Fachbegriff aus der Golfsprache hielten.

Die allgemeine Unkenntnis hat auch Vorteile, jedenfalls für diejenigen, die sich auskennen. Zur Politik hat jeder eine Meinung, auch weil jeder sich eine zutraut, das ist wie im Sport. Bei einer Diskussion zu einem Wirtschaftsthema muss man nur ein paar Worte über die Außenhandelsbilanz fallenlassen, und schon zieht sich der unkundige Gesprächspartner erschreckt zurück.

Ich arbeite jetzt seit über zwölf Jahren mit ein paar Unterbrechungen im Wirtschaftsressort des SPIEGEL; eigentlich habe ich Philosophie und Literatur studiert, aber schon die Position als Wirtschaftsredakteur lässt alle offenkundig darüber hinwegsehen, dass ich nicht vom Fach bin. Ich habe viele hitzige Diskussionen erlebt, noch die scheinbar nichtigsten Ereignisse können unter Journalisten zu erregten Auseinandersetzungen führen. Aber ich kann mich an keine Debatte erinnern, in der sich jemand wegen seiner Haltung zur jüngsten Zinsentscheidung der Zentralbanken rechtfertigen musste. Oder wegen der Kritik an den neuen Bankenregeln.

Ökonomie galt nie als exakte Wissenschaft, eher als intellektuelle Übung

Ich muss gestehen, dass ich die nähere Beschäftigung mit Wirtschaftstheorien immer faszinierend fand, das liegt sicher auch an dem spielerischen Charakter des Ganzen. Der Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften war aus gutem Grund der letzte, der in Stockholm ins Leben gerufen wurde. Ökonomie galt nie als exakte Wissenschaft, eher als intellektuelle Übung, die in scheinbar naturwüchsig sich vollziehenden Prozessen wie einer Börsenpanik Gesetzmäßigkeiten zu erkennen sucht, aus denen sich für die Zukunft etwas lernen lässt.

Der Begründer der Nationalökonomie, der Schotte Adam Smith, war Philosoph, ein Fach, das sich von alters her mit den Beweggründen menschlichen Handelns auseinandergesetzt hat. Auch die Wirtschaftswissenschaft ist zunächst Lehre vom Menschen oder genauer: Untersuchung der menschlichen Antriebe, die ihn dazu bringen, sich ökonomisch, und das hieß schon für Smith: im wohlverstandenen Eigeninteresse, zu verhalten. Diese Nüchternheit macht die wirtschaftliche Betrachtung allerdings auch bei allen, die sich ihre romantischen Vorstellungen von der prinzipiellen Güte des Einzelnen erhalten wollen, so suspekt.

Der Homo oeconomicus ist leider für jede ideale Wirtschaftsordnung ungeeignet. Politik, die auf die Fähigkeit des Einzelnen zum Maßhalten aus Einsicht setzt, muss schnell feststellen, dass Selbstbescheidung nicht die erste Tugend des Menschen ist. Natürlich ist es für das Gesundheitssystem nützlich und wünschenswert, wenn die Versicherten nicht wegen jedes Zipperleins zum Arzt rennen, nur weil sie der Mehrbesuch nichts kostet - das hält viele Patienten aber nicht davon ab, sich auch dann ins Wartezimmer zu setzen, wenn sie einfach nichts Besseres zu tun haben.

Manchmal bewirkt das Gutgemeinte sogar das Gegenteil von dem, was geplant ist. Vor gar nicht so langer Zeit hat sich die schwarz-gelbe Regierung auf die Einführung eines Betreuungsgeldes für all diejenigen geeinigt, die ihre Kinder lieber zu Hause erziehen, als sie in einen staatlichen Hort zu geben. Gedacht war die Zuwendung für die Hausfrau, die bei der Familienförderung bisher leer ausgegangen war. Allerdings dürfen sich auch ganz viele Familien dafür bewerben, bei denen der Staat großes Interesse daran hat, dass die Kinder möglichst früh in eine vernünftige Umgebung kommen, alle Hartz-IV-Empfänger zum Beispiel, die mit der Erziehung überfordert sind. Die Leute müssen ja nur nachrechnen: Die kostenlose Kita-Erziehung bringt ihnen weniger als die neue Alimentation.

3. Teil: Die Leistungsbilanz des Kapitalismus ist eigentlich ganz in Ordnung

Es drängt sich die Frage auf, woran es liegen mag, dass eine Nation, die immer stolz auf ihre Wirtschaft war, über eine Reihe wirtschaftlicher Grundsätze eher vage unterrichtet ist. Man sollte vermuten, dass in einem Land, das so stark wie wenige von dem Export seiner Güter abhängt, schon im Kindergarten ein Interesse an ökonomischen Sachverhalten geweckt wird, auf jeden Fall aber in der Schule, die ja das intellektuelle Rüstzeug fürs spätere Leben bereitstellt.

Das genaue Gegenteil ist der Fall. Für alles ist in der Schule Platz, für das Chruschtschow-Ultimatum, Max Frischs Dramen, das Liebesleben der Schnecken und die physikalischen Eigenschaften von Schwingungen - nur für so etwas Simples wie Angebot und Nachfrage bleibt keine Zeit. Tatsächlich kann heute ein Gymnasiast in Deutschland mühelos Abitur machen, ohne jemals auch nur von Joseph Schumpeter, John Maynard Keynes oder Milton Friedman gehört zu haben, die mit ihren Theorien bis heute die Wirtschaftspolitik bestimmen.

Man kann das für eine Nachlässigkeit halten, eine Unaufmerksamkeit der mit den Lehrplänen befassten Schulplaner. Man kann aber auch Absicht dahinter vermuten, eine bewusste Ausgrenzung der Ökonomie vom schönen Schulort, die aus einer gewissen Arroganz gegenüber allen Gelddingen entspringt. Die Vermehrung von Kapital galt in kulturnahen Kreisen noch nie als ein Topos, über das es sich mehr zu erfahren lohnte.

Die Verteidiger des Kapitalismus kann man an einer Hand abzählen

Zu meiner Schulzeit war man nicht nur stolz darauf, nichts über die Marktwirtschaft zu wissen, das demonstrative Nichtwissen war eine Haltung, gegen die sich nur unter Inkaufnahme allgemeiner Verachtung verstoßen ließ. Wer zu erkennen gab, dass er sich für Geld interessierte, gar an eine Karriere in der Wirtschaft dachte, hatte sich als Spießer enttarnt, ja als jemand, dem jeder moralische Kompass abhandengekommen war. Ich habe 1982 Abitur gemacht, als ich aufs Gymnasium kam, tauchten die ersten Achtundsechziger gerade als Referendare auf, aber ich fürchte, was die Behandlung des Kapitalismus im Schulalltag angeht, hat sich nicht viel geändert.

Schon ein Elternhaus, in dem jemand sein Geld als Selbständiger verdiente, reichte aus, um einen verdächtig zu machen. Dieser Makel ließ sich nur durch radikale Distanzierung tilgen - weshalb die flammendsten Anhänger der sozialistischen Utopie aus eher begüterten Verhältnissen stammten. Doch was blieb den armen Kerlen, die einen Unternehmer als Vater hatten, anderes übrig? Unternehmer waren an allem schuld, am sauren Regen und am Waldsterben, am Ozonloch, dem Gift in den Flüssen, am Hunger in Afrika - und, weil wir schon mal dabei waren, auch an der Aids-Katastrophe und der Überbevölkerung. Hinter jedem Übel steckte irgendwo ein Kapitalist, der den lieben langen Tag über die Profitmaximierung nachsann.

An der Leistungsbilanz des Kapitalismus kann es nicht liegen, dass er in so schlechtem Ansehen steht. Kein Wirtschaftssystem hat mehr gegen Armut und Hunger getan, vor allem die vielgeschmähte Globalisierung hat sich für Millionen als Segen erwiesen und ihr Los spürbar gebessert. 1820 lebten nach heutiger Kaufkraft 85 Prozent der Weltbevölkerung von weniger als einem Dollar am Tag, heute sind es nur noch 20 Prozent. Der Soziologe Peter Saunders hat darauf hingewiesen, dass am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts die Lebenserwartung in den ärmsten Ländern 15 Jahre mehr betrug als die durchschnittliche Lebenserwartung zu Beginn des vergangenen Jahrhunderts im damals reichsten Land der Welt, in Großbritannien. Aber es hilft nichts - wenn der Kapitalismus zur Debatte steht, kann man seine Verteidiger an einer Hand abzählen.

Müßiggang ist auf Dauer nicht besonders nachhaltig

Bill Gates mag Milliarden pro Jahr zur Bekämpfung von Krankheiten wie Aids und Malaria spenden und damit mutmaßlich mehr zur Linderung der weltweiten Not getan haben als alle arabischen Öl-Emirate zusammen, aber auf den T-Shirts der Jugend prangt der Kopf von Ernesto Che Guevara, dessen Beitrag zur Armutsbekämpfung wilde Reden, eine romantische Motorradfahrt durch Südamerika und ein gescheiterter Umsturzversuch im bolivianischen Urwald sind, bei dem er zum Zeitvertreib gern am frühen Nachmittag ein paar Scheinexekutionen vornehmen ließ.

Manchmal denke ich, dass wir uns schon aus wohlverstandenem Eigeninteresse mehr wirtschaftliche Erziehung wünschen sollten. Es gibt nicht viele Industrienationen, in denen es nicht mehr überall selbstverständlich ist, dass die Zahl der Leistungserbringer die der Leistungsempfänger übersteigen sollte. Nehmen wir nur Berlin, Hauptstadt des Landes: Nur 40 Prozent der Einwohner gehen dort noch einer geregelten Arbeit nach, die anderen sind zu jung, zu alt oder an anderem interessiert.

Freunde aus dem Ausland sind regelmäßig verblüfft, dass man an einem normalen Werktag morgens um 11 Uhr in kaum einem Straßencafé noch einen Platz bekommt. Sie vermuten im ersten Moment, dass viele Berliner um diese Zeit eine Mittagspause einlegen, weil sie so früh zu arbeiten beginnen. Ich muss sie dann regelmäßig aufklären, dass es sich um Frühstücksgäste handelt, die gerade das Haus verlassen haben.

Es ist eine schöne Sache, wenn die Menschen ihre Zeit mit Müßiggang verbringen. Ich fürchte nur, dass diese Lebensweise auf Dauer nicht besonders nachhaltig ist. Aber auch das gehört vermutlich zu der kalten ökonomischen Vernunft, von der man lieber verschont bleibt.

绿鞋机制

绿鞋机制_互动百科

摘要

绿鞋机制（Green Shoe Option）又称“绿鞋期权”，由美国绿鞋公司首次公开发行股票（IPO）时率先使用而得名，是超额配售选择权制度的俗称。
根据中国证监会2006年颁布的《证券发行与承销管理办法》第48条规定：“首次公开发行股票数量在４亿股以上的，发行人及其主承销商可以在发行方案中采用超额配售选择权”。该机制可以稳定大盘股上市后的股价走势，防止股价大起大落。工行2006年IPO时采用过“绿鞋机制”发行。
绿鞋机制-由来

绿鞋机制

“绿鞋机制”由美国名为波士顿绿鞋制造公司1963年首次公开发行股票（IPO）时率先使用而得名，是超额配售选择权制度的俗称。
绿鞋机制主要在市场气氛不佳、对发行结果不乐观或难以预料的情况下使用。用以稳定股价，可在一定程度上防止新股发行上市后破发，增强参与一级市场认购的投资者的信心，实现新股股价由一级市场向二级市场的平稳过渡。采用“绿鞋”机制可根据市场情况调节融资规模，使供求平衡。[1][2][3]
绿鞋机制-实例
例子：就拿中国国航说，比如预计发行8亿股，那么就发行9.2亿股出去，如果投资者认可该股，那么就增加1.2亿股发行额度，发行9.2亿股，如果该股跌破发行价，那么主承销商就买回1.2亿股，还发行8亿股，从而对股价构成一定的支撑，承销商能够赚取一些差价，投资者也可以在买错了股票后止损出局，这对于任何一方都是十分有利的。
绿鞋机制-主要功能
绿鞋机制的功能主要有：承销商在股票上市之日起30天内，可以择机按同一发行价格比预定规模多发15%（一般不超过15%）的股份。
这一功能的体现在：如果发行人股票上市之后的价格低于发行价，主承销商用事先超额发售股票获得的资金（事先认购超额发售投资者的资金），按不高于发行价的价格从二级市场买入，然后分配给提出超额认购申请的投资者；如果发行人股票上市后的价格高于发行价，主承销商就要求发行人增发15%的股票，分配给事先提出认购申请的投资者，增发新股资金归发行人所有，增发部分计入本次发行股数量的一部分。根据市场情况，其最终行使结果包括完全行使、部分行使、完全不行使三种情况。
绿鞋机制-实际运用
国际市场几乎每个新股发行都有绿鞋。在实际操作中，超额发售的数量由发行人与主承销商协商确定，一般在5%~15%范围内，并且该期权可以部分行使。 同时，承销商在什么时间行使超额配售权也存在一定变数。 　　
行使超额配售权，对于上市公司来说可以多融入资金，对于承销商来说，则可以按比例多获得承销费，利于新股的成功发行，在一定程度上也保护了投资者利益。因而是多赢的安排。 　　
还有一个附加效果是，超额配售的股票一般会配售给与承销团关系密切的投资者，由于配售价格与发行价一致，并低于市场价，投资者有利可图，主承销商也可借此进一步巩固与各财团的关系。 　　
在许可卖空的情况下，如果超额配售未获发行人许可，则被称为"光脚鞋"(Bare Shoe)，一旦股票上市后股价上涨，包销商就必须以高于发行价的价格购回其所超额配售的股份，从而遭受经济损失。

绿鞋机制-中国市场
2010年7月，绿鞋机制力保农行发行价
中国证监会2006年颁布的《证券发行与承销管理办法》第48条规定：“首次公开发行股票数量在4亿股以上的，发行人及其主承销商可以在发行方案中采用超额配售选择权”。这其中的“超额配售选择权”就是俗称绿鞋机制。

积极作用

绿鞋机制的形成和运用，是市场化发行方式发展到一定阶段，为适应迅速变化的市场状况而出现的，是发行人和主承销商适当调节发行规模，减少新股上市波动而建立的一种技术安排，是对国内市场迅速变化的发行方式的有效完善和补充。
首先，在股份上市后一定期间内对股票价格起到维护稳定作用。
股票上市后，当投资者热捧，股价上扬，承销商便可使用绿鞋机制，要求发行人增发股票。股票供给量增加，平抑了多头市场股价的持续上扬，甚至使股价下移，接近发行价。当投资者反映不佳，股价跌破发行价，承销商又可动用绿鞋机制所筹的资金从二级市场购买发行人股票，股票需求量增加，阻止了股价的持续下跌，甚至使价格上移，接近发行价。这样使得一级市场发行的股票供给更加贴近市场需求，增加了股票的市场流通性，从而使价格发现过程更加平稳，减小了新股上市后的波动，维护了股价的稳定。
其次，主承销商的承销风险会有所降低。
市场化发行使主承销商暴露在更大风险下。发行价格是考验主承销定价水平的一项高智能工作，需要发行人与主承销商适应市场的迅速变化。发行定价过高将导致主承销商承受经济损失。当运用绿鞋机制，在行使期内，若上市后供不应求，股价高涨，承销商当然无须回购超额配售的股票；而若发行定价过高，市场出现认购不足，股价跌破发行价，承销商则可用超额发售股票所获资金，从集中竞价交易市场中按不高于发行价的价格回购新股，发售给提出认购申请的投资者，使得股价上移，形成了对股价的一定支撑作用。因此大多数情况下股价会在接近发行价或发行价以上运行，股价跌破发行价的可能性大幅降低。这就减少了主承销商当初判断失误而可能造成的损失，使其承销风险有所释放，提高了主承销商调控市场、抵御发行风险的能力，维护了发行人及主承销商形象，保证发行成功。
再次，上市公司将获得更多的筹资量。
现在中国股市一级市场新股发行供不应求，二级市场股价多数上扬。这种情况下，运用绿鞋机制，主承销商便可要求发行人增发股票，从而发行人可获发行此部分新股所筹集的资金。这使发行人的融资数量弹性化，为上市公司提供了更大的发展机会。
最后，抑制一级市场投机气氛，减少二级市场波动。
现在中国巨额资金滞留囤积在一级市场进行新股申购，市场投机气氛严重，不利于中国证券市场稳定发展。实施绿鞋机制的新股发行量可比没有实施时多15%，这有利于承销商根据市场具体情况，作出相应决策，或要求发行人增发新股，或从二级市场买入股票，灵活性强，可逆性强。一方面，利于平抑二级市场股价涨跌，促使二级市场股价与一级市场新股发行价接轨，缩小一、二级市场的差价，对一级市场新股申购的资金起到一定疏导作用，客观上起到了抑制一级市场投机的作用；另一方面，也利于多头及空头市场股价的稳定，减小股指的波动，有利于大盘的稳定及股市的平稳发展。

缺陷与弊端

绿鞋机制并不是十全十美，在对中国股市具有的积极作用下，它具有二重性质，它的运作存在着缺陷与弊端。
第一，诱导上市公司产生“投资饥渴症”，助长恶性圈钱之风。
现在中国上市公司的股权结构大多存在“一股独大”现象，控股股东利益与普通投资者利益不一致。为了追求控股股东利益，上市公司必然会最大限度从普通投资者手中募股筹资。而绿鞋机制给予了控股股东或其代理人一个更大的操纵工具。它的实施极可能被利用来在股票发行时，上市公司不惜违背诚信，不顾市场实际情况，盲目的尽可能使用最大限度的超额配售选择权，发售新股给认购的投资者，最大程度募集股金，从而引发上市公司“投资饥渴症”，助长其恶性圈钱行为。这个过程中受益最大的只有上市公司控股股东和高级管理层，普通投资者利益被削弱殆尽，对股市的良好平稳运行将是巨大打击。
第二，弱化了主承销商的风险意识，不利于其经营管理的改善。
绿鞋机制的实施，可使主承销商纠正当初失误的判断，把可能造成的损失降低到最低。这将会大大弱化主承销商的风险意识，其极可能不根据市场变化选择承销方式，不对中长期趋势作正确的判断和预测，而是过度依赖绿鞋机制使用的无风险或低风险，追求多获承销费。主承销商继将续在低水平低风险层次上进行竞争，不利于其风险意识的树立，不利于其落后的经营管理水平的提高，从长期看，也将阻碍资本市场的发展，损害各方参与者利益。
第三，造成市场的不平等竞争，滋生投机和腐败。
一方面，由于配售部分绝大多数为重仓，能够进行超额配售选择权认购的几乎只能为机构投资者，中小投资者因资金实力限制被排除在外，造成了市场参与者的不平等竞争。另一方面，绿鞋机制实则一种股票期货交易方式的演变，其规范与监管难度极大。机构投资者因其自身强大的资金实力及信息获取能力等各方面优势，在配售选择权行使时，及易与承销商联手，导致关联方的暗箱操作，甚至进行违法违规操作，这就为投机与腐败的产生提供了机会。
第四，市场监管机构的监管能力、自律能力与市场公信力将经受严峻考验。
市场监管机构的职责是营造公平竞争的环境，维护市场秩序和原则，保护投资者利益。若投资者认购超额配售的新股后，市场表现不佳，道德风险和逆向选择等恶性事件频频发生，那么监管机构的各方面能力都将受到强大冲击。

规范机制的意见

针对绿鞋机制出现的弊端，要规范股票发行制度，维护市场的有效秩序及各方的利益，可从如下几方面进行规格与规范。
1、重构上市公司股权结构，改变目前其“一股独大”的现象，建立合理的股权结构，从而消除不合理的结构带来的种种弊端，促使其内部治理机制趋于健全与完善。
2、增强主承销商的责任与风险意识，在进行承销时，主承销商要提高其对上市公司综合实力、证券未来运行状况及趋势的判断能力，并致力于改善其经营管理机制的改善。
3、增强市场透明度，发行人和主承销商应当严格遵守信息披露义务，在实施绿鞋机制过程前后，及时准确的向证监会报告，及时准确的向市场公告，接受市场监督。
4、市场监管机构要加大监管力度，严厉打击上市公司、主承销商、机构投资者等关联方的暗箱操作甚至违法操作，把普通投资者利益放在第一位，重建与巩固市场信用。

注释：

[1]^全科论文中心 论“绿鞋机制”的机理及其二重性分析 2009-7-15
[2]^股天下 绿鞋机制 2009-5-24
[3]^网易：绿鞋机制，2010年7月14日

Watching the Euro

Background Reading 背景

• Eastern Europe's economies: What went right
• Greece's debt crisis: On the edge of the abyss 
• Europe's sovereign-debt crisis: Acropolis now 
• Germany and Greece: Neither a borrower nor a lender be
• Charlemagne: The euro's existential worries 
• The Baltic states: Euro not bust
• Charlemagne: Financial fortress Europe

Debate 辩论

http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/174

Charlemagne: Financial fortress Europe

The euro-zone rescue package does not mean common economic government. But the rules are clearly changing

May 13th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

SINCE 1949, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has bound NATO members to a solemn vow: an armed attack on one of the alliance shall be treated as an attack against all. With international markets closed to Greece, and contagion threatening Portugal and Spain, European Union leaders agreed to a similar pledge after a pair of gruelling, late-night meetings on May 7th and 9th.

From now on, they in effect declared, markets betting against one member of the euro zone would meet a swift response from all 16. Emergency finance would be channelled to vulnerable governments from an array of fighting funds of up to €750 billion ($950 billion) variously loaned or guaranteed by EU countries, euro-zone members and the IMF (see article).

Markets rallied, for a day or two at least. There was shock in Germany, where critics in the press and parliament accused Chancellor Angela Merkel of allowing the EU to become a “transfer union”, in which countries that stuck to EU rules would find their cash siphoned to the profligate.

From France there was crowing. President Nicolas Sarkozy claimed credit for a plan that he called “95%” French. He hailed the emergence of a new decision-making body at the EU’s inner core, made up of leaders from the 16 euro-zone countries. Such a “council of the euro zone”, as he called it, is not found in any EU treaty, but has been a French dream for years.

In Britain a scandalised press claimed the country could pay out anything between £10 billion ($15 billion) and £43 billion to prop up a single currency it did not even use. (The outgoing chancellor, Alistair Darling, said the real sum was £8 billion at most.)

This much is clear: the €750 billion plan is only a temporary fix. The scheme is designed to protect weak links in the euro zone for the next three years, buying them the breathing space to shore up public finances, clean up banks and retool uncompetitive economies so they can grow again and pay off their debts. “If we don’t succeed in restoring sound fundamentals in most of the euro zone, this crisis will come back,” admits a senior European politician.

What the scheme is not is a giant leap towards a common economic government, with the power to siphon huge sums from rich to poor bits of the union. It looks more like a mutual defence pact: an attack on one euro-zone member is now an attack on all. Countries that sign up to NATO’s Article 5 make a serious commitment. They are asked to send troops for joint training, spend a certain amount on defence and so on. But their pact does not mean there is a single NATO army.

Nevertheless, the rules of the euro zone—supposedly based on a Germanic vision of budgetary discipline and an independent European Central Bank (ECB)—are clearly in flux. The ECB started buying government bonds on the financial markets on May 10th: precisely the step urged on it by EU politicians and big banks. Allies of the ECB’s boss, Jean-Claude Trichet, insist he was reacting to market pressures, not assaults on his independence. But the episode caused angst in Germany, and beyond.

EU leaders agreed to a €60 billion facility controlled by the European Commission, funded by borrowing against the EU’s central budget, and so ultimately guaranteed by all 27 members of the EU. The legal basis was a bit of the Lisbon treaty that empowers the commission to send emergency money to countries hit by natural disasters or other “exceptional” crises. But leaders resisted a second, much more ambitious move by the commission: to use the same treaty clause to create a stabilisation fund of unlimited size that it would also control, this time borrowing against loan guarantees from national governments.

Instead, at the insistence of Germany and allies like the Netherlands and Finland, the largest part of the euro-zone defence system, a war chest of up to €440 billion, will be run as a “special purpose vehicle” controlled by national governments. It will not be controlled by the commission, and will issue money only under tough conditions set by the IMF.

Are you with us, Dave?

Yet if the new euro-zone scheme has not centralised power, it is an open question whether power is flowing to the euro countries, creating an “inner core” of 16 at the expense of outliers like Britain. On the one hand, Germany remains wary of a powerful euro zone, fearing that the French want to build up a political body with the clout to bully the ECB. Basically, sighs a senior figure, the French still think of Mr Trichet as “a civil servant, appointed by the French government”. Moreover, although Germany and France may both talk about enhanced economic governance, they mean very different things by it: for France, interventionism; for Germany, the harmonisation of rigour.

On the other hand, there is much grumbling about Britain’s refusal to join the larger €440 billion defence scheme, when British banks are heavily exposed in places like Spain and Ireland, through cross-ownership and debt holdings (and when Poland and Sweden, which like Britain do not use the euro, will join in). On May 9th a “furious” Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister, confronted Mr Darling, sources say. Other finance ministers asked aloud whether Britain could expect EU solidarity if the pound came under attack.

If Gordon Brown had stayed on as prime minister, it is said, he might have joined the euro-zone defence scheme, though Britain’s Treasury was opposed. To David Cameron’s new government, even with the pro-European Liberal Democrats on board, the very idea may sound fantastical. But it is not: if contagion hits Spain, for instance, Britain will face calls for EU solidarity.

Mr Cameron says he wants to avoid distracting Euro-rows as he takes office. He may not be able to avoid them.

The Baltic states: Euro not bust

Estonia gets a green light to join the euro. Other Baltic states will benefit too

May 13th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

SURPRISES are Estonia’s stock in trade. Its return to the world map in 1991 after a 51-year absence startled outsiders. So did what came next: a fast-growing economy, based on flat taxes, free trade and a currency board. In 2004 it confounded pessimists’ expectations by joining the European Union and NATO. Now it is set to pull off another coup, gaining green lights from the European Commission and the European Central Bank in its bid to adopt the euro on January 1st 2011.

Many thought that highly unlikely. Only two years ago a property bubble in the country popped, rocking the banking system and sending GDP plunging by 14.1% in 2009. Doom-mongers said devaluation was inevitable. But they were wrong. Flexible wages and prices have helped the economy stabilise: unit labour costs fell by 7.5% in the final quarter of 2009. Exports were up by a sixth in the first quarter of 2010 and the central bank forecasts growth this year of 1% (although that depends on the pace of recovery in Sweden and other export markets).

Thanks to a fiscal tightening of a stonking 7.5% of GDP, Estonia easily meets the euro zone’s public-finance rules. Its gross debt in 2009 was only 7.2% of GDP (compared with 115% in Italy), and the government deficit is 1.7% (Greece’s is 13.6%). The concern is sustainability: will future governments be so thrifty? Inflation is low: in the past 12 months the average figure was negative, at -0.7% well below the euro zone’s 1% target. But the ECB report calls for “continued vigilance”, as well as efforts to raise productivity and competitiveness.

The real problem for Estonia is political, not economic. Some euro-zone members (France is often mentioned) think that allowing an obscure and volatile ex-communist economy to join a currency union that already has too many dodgy members should not be a priority. If Estonia is really so solid, why not wait a year to be sure?

Yet that would send a perverse message. Estonia is almost the only country in the whole EU that actually meets the common currency’s rules. All those that use the euro have gaily breached the deficit and debt limits. The grit shown by Estonian politicians and the public in shrinking spending, raising taxes and cutting wages has been exemplary. Punishing Estonia, which obeyed the rules, while bailing out Greece, which has breached them flagrantly, would do little for the euro’s credibility with governments and investors alike.

Estonia has two more hurdles to jump before it can scotch the scoffers: an EU committee meeting at the end of May, followed by a finance ministers’ summit in early June. Few think that France and other doubters will actually block Estonia’s bid; persuasion and horse-trading will probably bring agreement. Then the decision will be irrevocable. That will give heart to Latvia and Lithuania, which hope to join the euro later in the decade. Like Estonia, their currencies are pegged to the euro, so they bear the pain of a rigid monetary regime, but also miss out on the lower borrowing costs and higher investment that membership of the currency can bring.

The next task is to stoke growth and cut unemployment (now over 15%). After that, the aim should be to reach Nordic-quality public services and an economy based on brainpower by 2018, when Estonia celebrates its 100th birthday and also holds the presidency of the EU.

Charlemagne: The euro's existential worries

What lies behind differences over the future of the euro

May 6th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

WILL the euro still exist in 10 years’ time? That is a trickier question to answer than it was three months ago, when European Union leaders first lined up in Brussels to wag their fingers at the markets and offer vague declarations of “solidarity” with Greece in its hour of fiscal need. The political will to preserve the euro should not be underestimated, any more than was the political will to create it. Indeed, EU resolve has strengthened since February. But the crisis has worsened even faster.

There is anger in Brussels that it took until May 2nd for the euro-zone countries to put real money on the table: €80 billion ($105 billion) to meet Greece’s borrowing needs, topped up by €30 billion from the IMF. Senior officials blame Germany for the delay. They concede that Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, has a defence: Greece would never have agreed to such an ambitious austerity plan if the bail-out had come sooner. Fine, the officials retort; but rescuing Greece only at the last possible moment before default has raised the cost by billions.

Around Brussels, there is much muttering about German selfishness and even nationalism. When it comes to existential questions about the euro, conventional EU wisdom also has an answer: that the single currency faces either “integration or disintegration.” By this, EU types mean that national governments must choose between doom and surrendering big new chunks of sovereignty over their budgets.

Euro-optimists argue that the bail-out for Greece is the first step towards a “fiscal union” in which stricter rules on budget discipline, backed by painful sanctions, would be offset by bigger transfers from thriftier to wobblier members of the club. Euro-pessimists mutter that Mrs Merkel seems more interested in punishing the profligate than in European solidarity. They point to her call to remove voting rights from spendthrift euro-zone members and for the orderly insolvency of the worst offenders.

The “integration v disintegration” argument is logical and neat. But it is also wrong. Or rather, it is a distraction to judge the euro crisis as a tussle between those clinging to national interests and those ready to centralise more power in the EU.

Deep down, tensions inside the euro-zone involve clashing social contracts and democratic preferences. Post-war German governments have won voters’ consent by offering thrift and monetary stability (a comfort for Germans with a folk memory of life savings lost to hyperinflation), plus an elaborately consensual capitalism. Greek governments have instead spent years buying social peace and votes with public spending, generous pensions, tax breaks, EU money and jobs for life, directed to an array of rent-seeking interest groups. This sort of social contract, lubricated by endemic corruption and lax law-enforcement, has evolved to suit a country emerging from a vile civil war and years of dictatorship in which consensus was painfully absent.

Unfortunately the Greek model has proved itself unsustainable. So Greece’s euro-zone partners, starting with Germany, are being asked to lend huge sums in the name of EU solidarity and peace on the streets of Athens. And that is genuinely hard. German voters, egged on by xenophobic tabloid headlines, do not want to pay for the Greek social contract. Moreover, bailing out a profligate member of the euro-zone breaches a German government pledge to its own voters: that the euro would be as solid as the D-mark. That leaves Germany forced to choose between two bedrock principles in its own social contract: economic stability and EU integration.

Amid voter hostility, Austria’s deputy chancellor and finance minister, Josef Pröll, said this week that Europe was “almost out of patience” with Greek street protests against austerity. The Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, said he would believe in Greek austerity plans only when he saw them enacted, declaring: “I don’t trust the Greeks.”

Yet IMF-drafted austerity plans also feel like a breach of contract for many ordinary Greeks, even those repelled when violence claims lives in Athens. Cutting civil-service pay seems unfair to officials who earn a pittance. Collecting more taxes may be vital, but will anger Greeks who must endure poor public services, pay bribes to secure decent hospital care and fork out for private tutors to help children betrayed by failing schools. The coming weeks will test whether Greece can change its social contract in ways that will render its economy sustainable. If it cannot, the Greek bushfire will spread. Above all, EU officials fear contagion spreading to Spain, a much bigger economy.

Behavioural science

Changing behaviour was always part of the euro project. Mario Monti, twice an Italian EU commissioner, wanted his country to join the euro precisely so that it would be forced into a more Germanic view of borrowing and spending, and stop robbing future generations to pay today’s interest groups. “I thought the euro would change Italian culture, and it did,” he says. Italy’s public debt may be high, but it has become more careful about deficits.

Senior Eurocrats insist they are not about to propose fiscal transfers within a single economic union. That is “not the logic” of their plans, says one. The focus is on rules and peer pressure. On May 12th the European Commission will unveil plans for more intrusive surveillance of national budgets, with tougher rules to enforce discipline.

But the euro will not be saved by rules alone. If the currency is to survive, the democratic instincts of Europeans who use it must align more closely. That is exceptionally hard to arrange. But here is a blunt truth: EU governments are not about to pool their national budgets. A convergence of social contracts—getting Greeks to behave more like Germans—may be the euro’s best hope.

Germany and Greece: Neither a borrower nor a lender be

The prospect of a bail-out is causing resentment in both Germany and Greece

Apr 29th 2010 | ATHENS AND BERLIN | From The Economist print edition

A message from Athens

ANGELA MERKEL’S political credibility has not yet been downgraded to junk status, but the past few days have done it no good at all. A few weeks ago the German chancellor was basking in plaudits for taking a hard line against a European bail-out of Greece. That was before George Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, bowed to the inevitable on April 23rd and asked for the €30 billion ($40 billion) loan pledged by Greece’s euro-zone partners, of which Germany’s share is about €8 billion. A further slice, of perhaps €15 billion, may come from the IMF.

Now Mrs Merkel is under fire both from those who had praised her and from those who now blame her for dragging out the rescue, further destabilising financial markets and raising the ultimate cost of the bail-out. Reported politicians’ estimates of the whole bill have soared to €120 billion and far beyond, with a correspondingly greater contribution from Germany.

Many Germans feel they are being forced to choose between two basic principles of their post-war economic order: economic stability and integration within Europe. They gave up the D-mark in 1999 on the understanding that the euro would be equally stable and that German taxpayers would not have to pay for other members’ mistakes. The impending bail-out of Greece—and perhaps later of Portugal and even Spain—would mean the end of that bargain. A Greek bail-out would no doubt face a challenge in Germany’s constitutional court. But to withhold aid would endanger the currency and rattle the banks, some of them German, with billions of euros’ worth of Greek debt on their books.

The crisis could not have come at a politically more awkward moment. On May 9th elections will be held in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state. There, a coalition of the Christian Democratic Union and the liberal Free Democratic Party, the same alliance that Mrs Merkel leads in Berlin, is fighting an uphill battle to remain in office. A loss would cost her government its majority in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the legislature. But the perception that she is dragging out the process to avoid irritating voters is also damaging her credibility both at home and abroad.

Now the process seems to have shifted into higher gear. On April 28th the chiefs of the IMF and the European Central Bank met German parliamentary leaders in Berlin. The finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, says the government could agree on legislation by May 3rd and get it through the parliament by May 7th. Voters in North Rhine-Westphalia will then decide whether to punish Mrs Merkel.

If Germans resent having to bail out the Greeks, the Greeks dislike the terms on which the rest of the euro zone and the IMF will come to their aid. The official jobless rate has risen to more than 11%, but that fails to take into account many women reluctant to register as unemployed.

Things are about to become more difficult. A three-year reform programme being put together by the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB aims to cut the budget deficit from 13.6% to 2.7% of GDP in just three years, an ambitious target in a shrinking economy. A new pensions law, which is due to be adopted in May, will raise the retirement age for both men and women and reduce the pensions paid by state-controlled corporations. Applications by civil servants to take early retirement under the existing scheme have already jumped by 30%.

The overstaffed public sector will be severely pruned. No one is certain how many jobs will go. But if the programme is rigorously implemented, more than 100,000 Greek public-sector workers will be put out of work by 2013—by a government that came to power promising “more social protection”.

So far, resignation not fury has marked street protests organised by trade unions and the Greek communist party. Fortunately for Mr Papandreou, his Panhellenic Socialist Movement, known as Pasok, dominates both ADEDY, the umbrella public-sector union, and GSEE, its private-sector partner. But the austerity measures the government adopted before the crisis reached boiling point—civil service pay cuts and a hiring freeze—are only just beginning to bite. Infighting in both unions is on the rise; small private-sector unions have already broken ranks and other hardliners are likely to gain ground.

Opinion polls suggest more than 60% of Greeks oppose the government’s decision to call in the fund. The IMF’s reputation for imposing harsh reforms, along with the partial surrender of sovereignty to an American-based institution, seems bound to make Greeks cross. Criticism of Germany, by comparison, is muted.

Europe's sovereign-debt crisis: Acropolis now

The Greek debt crisis is spreading. Europe needs a bolder, broader solution—and quickly

Apr 29th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

THERE comes a moment in many debt crises when events spiral out of control. As panic sets in, bond yields lurch sickeningly upwards and fear spreads to shares and currencies. In September 2008 the failure of once-stellar Lehman Brothers almost brought down the world’s banking system. A decade earlier, Russia’s chaotic default on its sovereign debt rocked the credit markets, felling Long Term Capital Management, a hugely profitable American hedge fund. When the unthinkable suddenly becomes the inevitable, without pausing in the realm of the improbable, then you have contagion.

The Greek crisis—or more properly Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis—looks dangerously close to that (see article). Even as negotiators from the European Union and the IMF are haggling with the Greek government over an ever-growing bail-out package, the yield on Greek debt has ballooned: two-year bonds soared towards 20% this week. Portugal’s borrowing costs jumped. Spain’s debt was downgraded, along with Portugal’s and Greece’s, and Italy came worryingly close to a failed debt auction. European stockmarkets have slumped and the euro itself fell to its lowest level in a year against the dollar.

The road into Hades…

It will strike some as mystifying that a small, peripheral economy should suddenly threaten the world’s biggest economic area. Yet, though it is only 2.6% of euro-zone GDP, Greece sounds three warnings that reach far beyond its borders.

The first is economic. Greece has become a symbol of government indebtedness. This crisis began last October when its new government admitted that its predecessor had falsified the national accounts. It is labouring under a budget deficit of 13.6% and a stock of debt equal to 115% of GDP. It cannot grow out of trouble because of fiscal retrenchment and its lack of export prowess. It cannot devalue, because it is in the euro zone. And yet its people seem unwilling to endure the cuts in wages and services needed to make the economy competitive. In short, Greece looks bust.

Few, if any, European countries suffer from all of Greece’s ills, but many scare investors. Portugal has a high budget deficit and is chronically uncompetitive. Spain has a low stock of debt, but it seems unable to restructure its economy. So too Italy, which is heavily indebted to boot. Non-euro-zone Britain has let its currency fall, but its budget deficit is unnerving.

The second lesson is political. Two weeks ago, having concluded that an eventual Greek restructuring was all but inevitable, we said Europe’s leaders had “three years to save the euro”. We presumed that they would quickly get a proposed €45 billion ($60 billion) deal to stave off an imminent and chaotic Greek default, buying time for an orderly rescheduling and for the other weak economies to begin overdue structural reforms. We overestimated their common sense.

The chief culprit is Germany. All along, it has tried to have it every way—to back Greece, but to punish it for its mistakes; to support the Greek economy, but not to spend any money doing so; to treat this as just a Greek problem, when German banks and German citizens, who lend to Greece, stand to lose money too. German voters do not favour aiding Greece. But rather than explain to them why it is in Germany’s interest, the chancellor, Angela Merkel, has run scared of upsetting them before a big regional election on May 9th.

Playing for time has backfired. Now the mooted rescue plan has climbed above €100 billion because no private money is available. The longer euro-zone governments dither, the more lenders doubt whether their promises to save Greece are worth anything. Each time politicians blame “speculators” (see article), investors wonder if they understand how bad things are (or indeed that investors have a choice). Euro-zone leaders initially refused to seek IMF help because it would be humiliating. Their ineptitude has done far more than their eventual decision to call in the IMF to damage the euro.

This political and economic failure leads to the third Greek warning: that contagion can spread through a large number of routes. A run on Greek banks is possible. So is a “sudden stop” of capital to other weaker euro-zone countries. Firms and banks in Spain and Portugal could find themselves shut out of global capital markets, as investors’ jitters spread from sovereign debt. Europe’s inter-bank market could seize up, unsure which banks would be hit by sovereign defaults. Even Britain could suffer, especially if the May 6th election is indecisive.

What then is to be done? The mounting crisis—and the fact that Greece will almost certainly not pay everybody back on time—will renew some calls to abandon it. That would spell chaos for Greece, European banks and other European countries: the effect would indeed be Lehman-like. Hence the necessity, even at this stage, of a show of financial force, linked to the construction of a stronger firewall between Greece and Europe’s other shaky countries. The priority for European policymakers is to do the same as governments eventually did with the banks: to get ahead of the crisis and to convince investors that they will spend whatever is necessary.

…and the expensive way back

The economics starts with the politics. Europe will not stem this crisis unless its decision-making apparatus is overhauled and Germany radically changes its tune. Mrs Merkel needs to go on German television and explain to her people what is at stake—laying out how much Germany has gained from the euro and what it has to lose from a cascade of chaotic sovereign defaults. Germans need to understand the risks to their banking system and their prosperity. They need to understand that stemming Greece’s debt crisis is less an act of charity than of self-interest. However unfair it seems—and the frugal Germans are as furious about the profligate Greeks as the rest of the world was about bankers—a bail-out is justifiable on the same logic: doing nothing would cost them even more.

The resolve cannot stop at Germany’s borders. Financial markets have no idea who is in charge. Europe’s Byzantine decision-making structure does not help but Germany needs to ensure that decisions are reached fast, that Europe speaks with one voice—and that co-ordination with the IMF is smooth. As a way to convince financial markets that the political weather has changed, the euro zone should set up a single crisis-management committee, with the power to take decisions.

Political resolve won’t work unless the underlying economics make sense. The first test of this is the Greek package. In return for fiscal and structural adjustments that give the economy a hope of stabilising its debts, this must provide enough money to prevent a forced default. Up to €150 billion may be needed over the next three years—better to err by offering too much. But the firebreak between Greece and the other embattled sovereigns of the euro zone is even more important. In economic terms, that should not be too hard to justify. Despite their problems, no country other than Greece is manifestly bust. Portugal is in the greatest danger, but it has a better history of fiscal adjustment which, under plausible assumptions, could allow its debt to stabilise at a manageable level. Spain and Italy could be made insolvent by a long period of high interest rates. But none has the near-inevitability of Greece.

Europe’s policymakers must make those distinctions clearer. The vulnerable economies must step up the reforms they need to rein in deficits and boost growth. Portugal, especially, needs action. The European Central Bank should demonstrate that it has the tools to maintain liquidity even if there is panic. Euro-zone governments should pre-emptively create inter-governmental liquidity lines. Thanks to extraordinary incompetence, Europe’s leaders have almost ensured that the Greek rescue failed before it began. They are paying for that today.

Greece's debt crisis: On the edge of the abyss

Europe's leaders must act fast to stop Greece’s market contagion spreading

Apr 28th 2010 | From The Economist online

IF A sense of panic has started to grip Europe over the potential for Greece to default on its debts, and the contagion to spread rapidly to the continent’s other struggling economies, it has not yet struck Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council. He insisted on Wednesday April 28th that there was “no question” of Greece's debts being restructured. He also said leaders of the euro-zone countries would meet next month to consider how to activate their proposed joint lending programme with the IMF to support Greece. Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, delivered an almost identical message, saying that a Greek default was “out of the question”.

The calm demeanour of Mr Trichet and Mr Van Rompuy is not shared by the markets. On Wednesday Greece said that it would ban the short-selling of shares for two months to prevent speculators doing further damage to the country’s banks. The previous day, shares in Greek banks had plunged by nearly 10% and the Athens stockmarket as a whole fell by 6% on fears that the country would soon suffer another downgrade of its debts. Those fears proved entirely justified. After the markets closed Standard & Poor’s heaped indignity on Greece by cutting the rating of its sovereign bonds to “junk” status. It also cut Greece's banks to “junk” because of their hefty exposure to government debt.

The markets still see the risk of a Greek default as high

Although the move to ban short-selling steadied Greece's stockmarket somewhat on Wednesday, the chances of the country defaulting on its debts were still perceived by the bond markets as high. Spreads on Greek government bonds (the risk premium compared with German bonds) reached a 13-year high as investors worried that the proposed rescue plan for Greece could stall. Talks between Greece, the European Union and the IMF got under way last week.

Greece was initially seeking up to €45 billion ($60 billion) in emergency loans from euro-zone governments and the IMF this year, the first chunk of which will be needed by May 19th, when the Greek government must refinance a €8.5 billion bond. But as the crisis has worsened it has become clear that Greece could need much more. On Wednesday it was reported that the EU and IMF were preparing a package worth up to €120 billion over three years—if so, the biggest sovereign rescue yet attempted. Nevertheless, even aid on this scale might only postpone an eventual default, if Greece's economy fails to grow faster than its debt pile.

Investors do not seem convinced that euro-zone governments will be able to muster the political will to hammer out an agreement. Germany, as the largest euro member, is vital to any effort to save Greece, but it is wavering. German public opinion is firmly set against dipping into the public purse to help the profligate Greeks. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, is in a tight spot. If she agrees to extend aid quickly to Greece a voters’ backlash back home may send her party crashing to defeat in regional elections set for May 9th. But if she sits back and watches Greece slide towards default, the contagion is sure to spread rapidly to other, bigger EU countries with debt problems—Mrs Merkel could then end up being blamed for triggering a far worse conflagration across Europe, including a fresh banking crisis.

Portugal is touted as the next European country at risk

Fears that Greece's fiscal crunch would spread to other euro-area countries have sent the region’s single currency reeling to a one-year low against the dollar. S&P's decision on Tuesday also to downgrade the debt of Portugal by a couple of notches pushed European and world stockmarkets lower. Portugal, despite a smaller budget deficit and lower public debt than Greece, is widely touted as the next European country that may suffer a sovereign-debt crisis. Portugal's slow-growing economy, drastic loss of competitiveness and high public and private indebtedness are all weaknesses that markets might put to greater test.

If Portugal comes under intense pressure, contagion might then spread to Ireland, Italy or Spain, the other euro-area countries with some mixture of big budget deficits, poor growth prospects and high debts. Only swift and decisive action by the leaders of Europe's big economies is likely to head off the current crisis. Default by a smaller member such as Greece would be a body blow to the euro's standing but it need not spell the end of the currency. However, that might not be the case if the problems spread further afield.

Eastern Europe's economies: What went right

If Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece want a lesson in how to take hard decisions, they should look eastward

Mar 18th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

IN THE depths of the financial crisis a year ago, it was easy to see how the woes of the ex-communist economies could cause huge problems for the rest of Europe. Western banks had lent recklessly in foreign currency to firms and households stricken by the downturn. If they all fled for the exit at once, dumping assets and stopping lending, the result would be carnage both at home and abroad. Also scary was the prospect of a currency crisis. If Latvia were forced off its peg with the euro, its Baltic neighbours might topple too. A combination of weak governments and angry voters looked ominous enough for some commentators, including this newspaper, to fret that the bill for bailing out new members from the east could be big enough to threaten the European Union.

In the event, the ex-communist economies have so far ridden out the storm (see article). Ex-communist Europe still has to grapple with its share of problems: an ageing workforce, bossy officials and poor infrastructure. But nobody has defaulted and nobody has rioted. Something went right—and it holds lessons for troubled countries in western Europe.

As easy as jeden, dwa, trzy

One reason for the ex-communist countries’ relative fortune is that they are not a homogenous block all of which is suffering in the same way. Few other countries had the huge debts that made Hungary so wobbly, or the gaping current-account deficit that made Latvia so vulnerable. Slovenia and Slovakia were shielded from currency speculators by being in the euro area. Poland, by far the biggest of the new EU countries, is in a category of its own: thanks to good government and good luck, it was the only European economy to boast economic growth in 2009. In short, Poland, Estonia and Bulgaria are as different in their way as are France, Finland and Greece.

International organisations also deserve some praise. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development helped stabilise the region’s banks, bringing foreign lenders together to ensure an orderly deleveraging instead of a rout. Both the European Commission and the European Central Bank realised that problems beyond the euro area could create headaches inside it. Their cheap loans helped foreign creditors and countries alike. And the IMF showed itself to be a collegial and flexible organisation, not the aloof, rigid outfit that EU leaders have foolishly rejected as a source of help for Greece and other troubled members of the euro.

Yet the greatest credit should go to the resilience and level-headedness of the region’s own politicians and citizens. Seemingly weak minority governments in places like Hungary and Latvia proved capable of making enormous fiscal adjustments. The east European economies, for all their faults, have shown more flexibility in both labour markets and in what they produce than have many older EU members. Moreover, the cuts in spending and increases in taxes and the retirement age that some ex-communist countries have imposed over the past year were much more savage than anything that Greece or Spain have so far contemplated.

That is salutary for the many countries that have yet to change public expectations enough to make big, painful structural changes more acceptable. Greece and the other Mediterranean countries in the euro area—Spain, Portugal and even Italy—nowadays seem to be sicker than ex-communist Europe. They should look east for a cure.